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The Politics of Middle-Class Return-to the City
Anglo-American Perspectives
In American political euphemism, the phrase "inner city" has
for some time served as a·surrogate for all .sorts of social
deprivation.

Broken homes, substandard housing, high crime rates,

increasing rates·of abandonment~ all fall.within the image this
phrase conjures up.

British usage, in recent years, has been

moving toward many similar connotations.

Standard "concentric

ring'' theories· of urban growth postulate an ever-outward migration·
of those with economic choices.
But despite such common
interpretations,. some types of central
.
/
.
city residence has always retained an aura of high social standing.
"Park Avenue" in New York and "Park Lane" in London have meanings
beyond the specific thoroughfares involved.

In recent years,

these.classic high-status neighborhoods have been added to by the
growth of "genirl.fication," the process·of the return to central
city renovated neighborhoods by middle-class (and especially uppermiddle-class) professionals.
With the development of gentrification have come divergent
social science analyses.

From some perspectives, any llback to the

city" movement is welcome because of the infusion·of economic
resources into depleted city treasuries,1 to.others, ~entrification
produces an unwelcome displacement of previous 11eighborhood residents,
who are likely to be poor and constrained in their.choice of
alternative housing.
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In this.paper, I shall be suggesting that the phenomenon
-

'

of middle-class return needs to be understood in the context of
the larger political and·economic systems in which this movement
takes place.

I shall be using both British and American evidence

to argue. that although some of the .same economic forces lie behind
this mo~ement in both ~ocieties;.variationa in political structures
have produced variations in response to the. gentrification trends
which.have de~eloped.
To begin with the similarities, the economic bases of _both
Britain and the. United States, and especially both c?untries'
large metropolitan centers,· have been:. chaning.
,~
'

Both societies

/

· · are moving away from employment predominantly based in manufacturing
and toward tertiary service sectors.

While. this change has been

going on for·a long time, and need not.necessarily result in
middle-class return to the city~ it •is a necessary precondition
for such a development.

It is not accidental.that.the highest

rates of gentrification are found in. precisely those urban neighborhoods which,· al though working-class in their recent history,· are
in close proximity to burgeoning centers of office development.

3

, The most visible signs of middle-class return can be found
in London, in Britain, and in Washington, -in the.UnitedStates.
·. As the commercial function o.f the City of London expands, and as
the non-governmental, but politically-interested-group association
headquarters continue· to centralize in Washington, their personnel ·
are prime·candidates for the gentrification movement.

While cities·

with weaker commercial cores may experience some middle-class
return, we should not anticipate finding it with anything like the vigor it displays when the central-office function is expanding.

l

-3.In addition to central office growth in some major metropolitan
centers, _both· societies are undergoing changes in their demographic
4
composition which promote middle·-class return, Both· s_ocieties
have post-World War II bulges in their birth rates, and in both
_societies this leads to high rates of new family formation as
this earlier generation matures,

High rates of family formation

ensure .·continuing pressure on th.e housing market,. at a time when
new suburban -housing construction is unlikely to be able to fully_ ·
keep pace,
Historically high rates of inflation, and their.concomitant
0

· impact on interest costs,/make the carrying charges for mortgages
on new construction out of the reach of individuals who might
have been able to afford new suburban housing in recent decades. 5
New environmental restrictions in the United States has had an
"impact on the availability of sites of suburban-construction in
many ways similar to the longer-term impact of Green.Belt legislatioti in Britain.~
Both Britain and the United States, in common with all other
Western industrial nations, have faced steep increases in energy
costs, and these-have begun to affect population distributions
as well.

While an energy-sufficient country like Britain

ought

.not face as severe a.set of future changes as the United States,
it begins with a much· higher energy-cost baise.

Energy costs,

par1ticularly as translated into home heating and commuting costs,
increase the attractiveness-of central residential locations,

-4Perhaps more difficult to document than any of the common
6har~cte~istics listed above, both Britain and the United States
have. experienced a growth·in the proportion of the population
likely to be,attracted to a gentrification movement for "cultural"
and not just,"economic"_ reasons.

Although the.concentration of

such individuals in certain metropo.li tan areas is, in some sense,
a function of the concentration of central-office commerical
.functions discussed,above, it also has an independent base of its
own.

Both societies have invested substantial resources in expansion

of educational facilities in recent decades, particularly in higher
education.

One •Of the cl 9 ssic arguments for· -large central cities

is that they provide locales for "culture."

With both societies

experiencing increasing proportions-of their populations with
formal exposurerto their"high cultures," we should not be surprised
7

to find increasing demand for access to it.

One consequence of

this-demand is, of course, demand for housing which makes the
high culture physically accessible.

None of this is to argue that

high rates of education are incompatible with suburbanization; the
data, .of course , clearly show the opposite.

Rather, it is to

suggest that one precondition for "gentrification" movements is a
critical mass of individuais with desires for·the type of lifestyle
central cities can afford to those with at leist moderate le~el~
of affluence.

Increasing rates of university education in Britain

and the U.S. increase the likelihood that this "critical mass" will
be reached for any particular metropolitan.area· or, indeed, for any
particular neighborhood.

-5Finally, both the U.S. and-Britain have.recently experienced
substantial population decline in their older central cities,.
In tniland, this dScline w~s in part due to consriious social
choices; the.bU:ilciing of _"overspill.estates" in suburban areas,
the development of "New Towns," and the use of financial incentives
to move manufacturing and commercial facilities to regions seen
as depressed.

No.such·explicit set of policies can be found in

the U.s·., but can readily be argued that a set of national decisions
was nonetheless.taken which had the effect of encouraging central
city population decline.

8

ti th population
decline
comes less pressure on the housing
.
/

1

stock of central cities •. While we are more accustomed to seeing
the obviously negative·consequence of this in vacant houses and
abandoned buildings, j,t. also has the consequence of making property.
more readily available for conversion to "gentrified" use.

(As

shall be seen below, the availability_of vacant housing has been
particularly important in some types.of American gentrification.)
The substantial drop in central-city populations, particularly
in many of the inner neighborhoods which have become prime foci for
gentrification, has other consequences as well;

Such neighborhoods

have had largely working-class populations in their pre-gentrification period~

Although, as I shall argue later, diversity·of

populatio~ is one of the ost~nsi~le attractions of "revival"
neighborhoods, it is clear that "too large" a poor and/or working..:
class population discourages many potential middle-class returnees.
While housing abandonment does not make for an attractive neighborhood physical appearance, neither would densely populated "slum

neighborhoods,· from the prospective of prospective gentrifiers.
· Thus, central city population decline ciakes gentrification possible
in two ways.

First, higher vacancy rates ~nd/or bandoned buildings

reduce property costs for those iriterested in_~rehabilitating" old
buildings. (This rehabilitation can be performed by the returnees
themselves, in some circumstances, but is more likely to be undertaken by local .real estate developers, both in theU.K .. and the

u.s~)

9 ,·

Second_, population de.cline in a formerly densely settled neighborhood means that the first wave of returnees form a significant.
percentage of neighborhood population from the very outset.
Had densities remained what they once were, then many potential
returnees might have been discouraged from the attempt at the outset.
·The social and economic circumstances described above, I have
argued, are common to both American and British neighborhoods which
have experienced middle~class return.

Differences in the urban

political. structures of the two . societies, I now wish to argue, •
has produced considerable variation in the response to gentrification.
American and British urban areas differ considerably in the
nature of their financial base.

While British local government is

severely restricted in the raising of local revenue, being permitted
only the use of property taxes, it has access to substantially more
.

central government subsidies than is available in the United States.
As I have argued elsewhere, ·what is crucial about the distinction
in urban public finance is not simply the relative extent of
national funding of urban expenditure, but the relative certainty.
of receiving funding in the future.

In Britain, the Rate Support

Grant is a routinized feature of national political life, in the
United States the continuance of·a variety of federal urban aid
11

schemes always seems politically problematic.

·

10
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As.a consequence of this distinction, I suggest, American
urban governments are more sensitive than those in Britain to
·changes in their local tax base.-

As a consequence, American

· cities are more likelY: to encourage middle;,,.class return, perceiving
it as a step toward less strain in municipal budgeting.

While such-

·sentiments·are not-necessarily absent in Britain, the·nature of
c.ehtral government transfer payments mutes the issue in comparison
with the U-.S.

· Anglo-American distinctions on this_ point are

reinforced by the somewhat broader range -of taxes available to
most American cities.

Return of.the middle class looks fiscally

attractive in the U.S. no;t only for its potential impact on property
values, . and therefore, over time,· .on property -taxes, but also because
. of its quicker impact on sales (and sometimes income) taxes.

Such

additional fiscal considerations are absent in Britain.But purely budgetary considerations are not the only difference
in American and British_responses to middle-class· return.

The

structure of local government., the structure of the party system,
and the range of local public services-also have impact.

Partic-

ularly in London, the .nature of borough government produces a
response to gentrification different from that seen in the U.S.
The nature of London Boroughs, comprising as they do relatively
small parts.of the entire metropolitan area, means that they areoften class-homogeneous.

Ward-based, partisan systems of- election

to borough councils provides an avenue to formal political power
for individuals and organizations which in American cities might
only be uno-fficial protest movements.

Thus, an American city

can take a decision to emphasize programs attractive to middleclass returnees and seek to encourage their arrival, and poor
neighborhoods which might_be·subject to displacement are without

-8-

formal power to resist.

Citywide majorities would have _to be

mobilized to defeat such a progran1.

A structure of borough govern-

ment, particularly if it has significant housing powers (as do
London Boroughs), makes resistance possible·even where broader
governmental forces might wish to.encourage middle-class return.
This potential for

resistance, however, would not.be activated

ex~ept in the presence of political organizations with community
power and with a perspective which-regarded middle-class entry
in strongly negative terms.

Such .a stance is taken by some, but

by no means all, local La.bour Party organizations in London.

Thus,

/

the legal structure of local government and the nature of the
·party system; mean that· some London Boroughs are likely to be
12
. .
' . t.ion •.
resisters
of gen t r1f1ca
One major vehicle for such resistance is provided by the
locally-controlled housing program.

Not all types of housing

are suitabl~ for gentrification, the housing needs to be of a
type that would be attractive to and open to middle-class returnees,
Despite the.different image of counc,il housing in the U.K. as
compared with public housing in the U.S., estates of council
housing ±o not provide a fruitful environment for gentrification
in London.

At the extreme, a local council might be successful

in converting so large a fraction of the local housing.stock-to
· council housing (either by clearance and rebuilding or by.·
rehabilitation of existing structures) that gentrification would
13

have a very limited scope indeed.
some parts of London.

.

.

Such has been the situation in

-9But the existence of "neighborhood" governmental structures
ih London (through the institution of the London Boroughs) does
not guarantee that there will be resistance·to gentrification.
Indeed, the very existence of such local structures has the potential for reinforcing gentrification trends, once they are able to
get underway in the first inst_ance.

Just as access to the insti tu-

. t:ibons of formal government authority make i.t possible for English
"resisters" to·be better mobilized than American protest groups,
so it is also true that newly-arrived middle-class residents of
English gentrification neighborhoods have access to formal power
not .so easily obtained in/the United States.

Examination of London

Boroughs of this type shows that such individuals are able to move
into positions of power at the Borough level; they do not need
either the political power or the motivation to ·control the London
government as a whole.
An examination of the literature suggests that the most
controversial aspect of gentrification, at least in the United
'

'

'

States, centers around the question of whether middle-class return
leads to significant displacement of previous poor and working14
class residents. Although conclusions differ, the dominant
theme seems to be that the volume of gentrification is not yet
15
sufficient to have caused widespread displacement, although there
are a few specific.neighborhoods which can be identified around
the U.S. where displacement has taken place.

16

But ·there is another consequence of this new social process
which is not much discussed. · This is the question of the impact
of middle-class return on urban political systems.

·I am arguing

that this impact is not dependent on gentrification becoming a
numerically predominant factor in urban demographics.

Rather,

-10gentrification can have impact in two other ways.

The entry of

a small numbei: of gentrifiers can change neighborhood ·political
processe_s ;. where new arrivals have the will to enter local affairs
they have advantages which suggest that they will be influential
17
in ways disproportional to their numbers in the community.
.The second major impact of gentrification which is not
entirely dependent on its numerical.extent is the impact gentrification has on "urban image."
paper that the phrase

0

I suggested at the outset of this

inner city" had become a euphemism for

deprivation in both the United States and Great Britain.

One

consequence of gentrifica;=ion is its potential for changing-this
perception.· Changes in this perception can have substantial
impact on future development in urban areas, and are particularly
important to the economic interests of the central business
districts of large·cities.

We can anticipate that those with

economic stakes in this area will provide strong support for
the further development of gentrification, and will· seek to
publicize its e*istence when and where it occurs.

To the extent

that such interests are historically better connected to American
.urban governments than to English ones, we can anticipate that
gentrification (perhaps not called by this name), will become a
regular part of ''civic boosterism" campaigns in American cities,
.

while its role in the U.K. will be more problematic.

18
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T.he impact of gentrification on ci ~ies can, therefore, be seen
as

multifaceted.

First is the direct impact, the effect of

a change.in .the population composition, and related changes in
tax base.and service demands. ·secondly, gentrification has the
potential for changing the leadership composition of a commuriity
even where there is not a change in numerical domination.

This

effect is. less direct since it.is contingent on the formal
political structures of. the community, and depend'ent on the
interest the new arrivals have in engaging in political activity.
A third, and even less direct impact, is the effect of
· gentrification on patterns of urban investment.

Even if its

participants are few in number, a city with a reputation for
''revitalization" may find its downtown business core more
•attractive to private investors •. The extent to which such a
development takes place is dependent both on the economic
circumstances of. the entire society, and on the relationships
betweeri the·city's business community and its political leadership.
A fourth, and quite different type of impact, comes in the
effect of gentrification on prior residents.

As I indicated

earlier, this issue, under the name of "displacement," has proven
to be the most controversial aspict of gentrification to date.
Some communities emphasize that middle-class return does not
produce displacement, since "revitalization" is concentrated in
areas of heavy housing abandonment.

Critics of this view both

disagree with the contention, and question whether city policy.
encourages departure by poor residents.

-12~

Aside frorrr displacement,. some debate takes place over the
consequences of middle-class arrival in a.previously poor neighborhood on its remaining poor residents.

Traditions of a more

self-contained working-class culture in England than is true in
the United States have led to more concern with this question in
Britain.·

Critics of gentrification suggest that working..:.class

residents are "entitled" to all workin.g-class neighborhoods,. free
from middle-class intrusion •. Such· reaction is less visible in
19
the United States, at least up to now.
But.any thoroughgoing assessment of gentrification.ultimately·
confronts the question of how extensive the movement is likely to
/

be.

As I indicated at the·outset, most observers now agree that

there· are few cities where in-migration of.new middle-class residents
exceeds their continuing outflow.

Is the interest in gentrification

itself just a "trendy" intellectual_phenomenon of the "man bites
dog" variety, interesting primarily because it takes place at all?
Or are the developments to date just the precursors of a social
trend which will rival mass suburbanization in its impact on
urban society?
Up to now, participants in this movement have come from such
a narrow spectrum of society that it is impossible to imagine
substantial numerical growth.

Only a.limited fraction of ~my
.

·20

·society will ever be made up of "young professionals.". Predictions
of numerica;L growth, therefore,.· depend on the predictions one wishes
·to make about the likely appeal of return.to the city for groups
which have. not yet participated.

-13Suburbanization itself provides a model for such a process.
Once. the pre~erve of the wealthy,.the.ideal of the "su1:5urban home"
came to permeate ,the national cul·ture, particularly in the United
. States, but in England as well~

Cha~ging technology, of which

mass automobile ownership was a prime prerequisite, and national
government policy, made possible the extension of the "suburban
dream" to. significant mas.ses of middle-class citizens.
Whether the type of "elite.gentrification" observed to date
is an early stage of a similar process is, of course, beyond
conclusive demonstration.

We do not yet see the "dream of the

town house" dominating American culture.

Lm•tger and more positive·

/·

traditions of_ urban living persist in Europe, and may make such
· ·a development,more likely in England than in the U.S.

But fashion

is.subject to change, and popular magazines already feature·
articles about central city lifestyles.

But just as changing

technology was fundamentally importa.nt to mass .suburbanization,
so would it be for mass return to the city.
The catalyst for such a·development, if it is.to take place,
would, by present understandings, have to be a sustained energy
shortage.

Higher prices~ Mare unlikely to be "sufficient"

to stimulate such a trend, since there is so much scope for
conservation within the suburban lifestyle.

If energy availability

becomes.sufficiently scare to interfere.with suburban mobility,
then we should expect to see a broadening of the gentrification
trend.

The relative energy supplies of the U.S. and the U.K. make.

such a development more likely in America, or at least make it
more likely·at an earlier time.

Predictions about future energy

-14-

'.

supplies are beyond the scope of this-paper, but·one consequence
of gentrification which we can already observe is that·it provides
an arena for contending economic and political forces to stake out
claims for turf which will become increasingly desirable and
valuable if the-"energy _crisis" turns out to be a crisis of
scarcity and not· just of price.

The politics of middle-class

return to. the· city could then· become the central theme of urban .
political:life.

/
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